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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
McKEE, Circuit Judge. 
 We are asked to review the district court's grant of 
summary judgment in favor of Hotel Employees and 
Restaurant Employees International Union ("HEREIU"), and 
Robert Baker and Carol Carlson; and against plaintiff 
George Ross. Ross sued under Title III of the Labor 
Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959. For the 
reasons that follow, we will affirm. 
 
I. Factual and Procedural Background1 
 
George Ross is a member of Local 57, a subordinate labor 
organization of HEREIU. Before January 6, 1998, Ross had 
been an elected non-salaried member of the Executive 
Board of that Local as well as an appointed full time 
salaried employee holding the title of business agent.2 
 
On September 5, 1995, the United States entered into a 
Consent Decree with HEREIU. The Consent Decree 
appointed a federal monitor "for the remedial objective of 
relieving HEREIU and Local 57 from the direct or indirect 
influence of any organized crime group or the threat of 
such an influence." App. At 104. Sometime during the 
summer of 1997, the United States Department of Justice 
began investigating organized crime's relationship with 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The procedural history of this appeal is rather unique as the district 
court entered summary judgment after declaring a mistrial. 
 
2. At all times relevant to the issues before us, Ross held an appointed 
office. 
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Local 57. Thereafter, the federal monitor brought charges of 
corruption involving several officers of Local 57 including 
Louis Sanfilippo, President; Nancy Davis, Secretary- 
Treasurer; Vince Fera, Recording Secretary; and Louis 
Masco, a union member. 
 
At the same time this investigation was proceeding, a 
power struggle erupted between Local 57's "power base" 
and three of the other officers of the Local: Ross, Nassan 
and Brown.3 Ross and Brown were then business agents of 
Local 57, and Nassan was a general organizer. According to 
Ross, the power struggle progressed to the point that the 
Local's Executive Secretary, Nancy Davis,4  asked the 
International to assume control of Local 57 by establishing 
a trusteeship. 
 
In November of 1997, the federal monitor also requested 
that a trusteeship be established based on the charges 
brought against the officers of Local 57. Eventually, Robert 
Baker was appointed as the first of two Trustees who 
assumed control of Local 57.5 On the same day he was 
appointed, Baker fired Nassan, Ross and Brown; and 
Sanfilippo resigned. However, Nassan, Ross and Brown 
were rehired within 24 hours of their firing after 
complaining to the monitor. 
 
An election for officers of Local 57 was scheduled for 
March 1998, but the Trustees canceled the election, and 
suspended the Local's constitution and by-laws. In April of 
1998, Ross, Nassan and Brown filed the first of two 
lawsuits challenging HEREIU's right to impose a 
trusteeship. They named HEREIU and the two Trustees as 
defendants (the "Trusteeship case"). The plaintiffs asserted 
that, "[g]iven the resignation of Sanfilippo and the failure of 
HEREIU or the Trustees to suspend Nancy Ross, it is clear 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. Inasmuch as we are reviewing a grant of summary judgment against 
Ross, we must assume that the allegations of his amended complaint are 
true, and draw all inferences which reasonably arise from those 
assertions in his favor as the nonmoving party. Woessner v. Air Liquide 
Inc., 242 F.3d 469, 471 (3d Cir. 2001). 
 
4. Nancy Davis is also referred to as Nancy Ross in the record, as she is 
George Ross' former wife. 
 
5. Carol Carlson was appointed as co-trustee about four weeks later. 
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that the continuation of the Trusteeship is improper and 
therefore must be dissolved." Ross' Complaint atP 26 (No. 
98-629). The plaintiffs sought declaratory and equitable 
relief under Title III of the Labor Management Reporting 
and Disclosure Act of 1959 (the "LMRDA") which governs 
the creation and maintenance of trusteeships by labor 
organizations. See 73 Stat. 519 SS 301-01 (1959), 29 U.S.C. 
SS 461-66 (1998 & Supp. 2000) The prayer for relief 
included a request that the court dissolve the Trusteeship, 
reinstate the constitution and by-laws of Local 57, and 
order immediate elections. The plaintiffs also moved for a 
TRO to enjoin the Trustees from running Local 57's 
operations. That motion was denied. At the end of April, 
Nassan and Brown withdrew from the lawsuit, leaving Ross 
as the only plaintiff.6 
 
During the summer of 1998, the Trustees decided to hold 
new elections and terminate the Trusteeship. They also 
issued new election guidelines under which Ross became 
ineligible to run for office because his union dues were 
delinquent. Ross argues that these guidelines were 
specifically intended to remove him as an eligible candidate.7 
In addition to the new election guidelines, the Trustees also 
"proposed a new Constitution which terminated George 
Ross' position as full time salaried business agent." Ross' 
Amended Complaint at P 38 (No. 98-629). 
 
In July of 1998, Ross filed a second lawsuit against the 
same defendants in state court (the "election case"). Ross 
sought a declaration that he was an eligible candidate for 
the upcoming election, and an injunction to prevent the 
election from proceeding until his eligibility could be 
determined. That suit was removed to federal court on 
motion of the defendants, and the district court thereafter 
refused to enjoin the election. Ross was not permitted to 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. Ross argues that Nassan "cut a deal" with HEREIU and the Trustees 
to dissolve the Trusteeship, and hold elections in exchange for Nassan 
withdrawing from the lawsuit and his support of Ross. 
 
7. In support of this argument, he points out that he had been elected 
to the Executive Board of Local 57 on three prior occasions even though 
his dues were then delinquent. Inasmuch as we are reviewing a grant of 
summary judgment, we must accept this argument as true. 
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run for office because of the aforementioned eligibility 
restrictions. On the day of the election, Ross, Nassan and 
Brown received letters terminating their employment as 
business agents. As a result of the election, Nassan was 
elected president and principle officer. After the swearing in 
of the new officers of the union, the Trusteeship was 
dissolved. Ross was not re-appointed as a business agent 
by the newly elected officers. 
 
In December of 1998, the defendants filed a motion for 
summary judgment in the Trusteeship case. They argued 
that Ross' claim for equitable relief had been rendered moot 
by the election of new officers and the resulting dissolution 
of the Trusteeship. Ross answered arguing that the crux of 
the Trusteeship case was that the Trusteeship had been 
imposed in bad faith to remove political opposition. He 
insisted that all actions carried out pursuant to the 
Trusteeship were void. In February of 1999, Ross filed an 
amended complaint in the Trusteeship case alleging 
continuing harm and asking the district court to: 
 
       Void the following actions taken in conjunction with 
       that Trusteeship: 
         i.  The suspension of the Local By-Laws and 
       Constitution; 
 
        ii.  The firing of the Plaintiff, George Ross on 
       January 6, 1998; 
 
        iii. The imposition of the new eligibility 
       requirements to run for elected office intended to 
       exclude George Ross as a candidate for the July, 
       1998 elections; 
 
        iv. The firing of George Ross on August 10, 1998. 
 
Ross' Amended Complaint, P 9 (No. 98-629). He also 
requested temporary reinstatement, scheduling of new 
elections, monetary damages, counsel fees, and costs. 
 
The district court consolidated Ross' two lawsuits and the 
matter was scheduled for trial. Essentially, Ross contended 
that he was harmed in two respects as a result of the 
improper continuation of the Trusteeship. He alleged that 
he had suffered damages as a result of being declared 
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ineligible to run for office in the August 1998 elections. He 
also alleged damages as a result of the termination of his 
appointed position as a business agent. Prior to trial, the 
defendants filed a motion in limine seeking to exclude 
evidence or argument regarding Ross' purportedly improper 
exclusion from the August election. The court denied that 
motion but did enter an order precluding Ross from 
"seek[ing] any relief which would effect a change in the 
union election." Ross v. Hotel Employees and Restaurant 
Employees Int'l Union, No. 98-1131, slip. op. at 9 (W.D. Pa. 
Oct. 4, 1999). 
 
After both sides rested in the ensuing trial, the jury 
reported that it was deadlocked and the court declared a 
mistrial. However, before the scheduled retrial was to begin, 
the defendants moved for summary judgment on all of 
Ross' claims. The defendants argued that Ross was 
precluded from asserting an individual claim for monetary 
damages under Title III of the LMRDA. Ross opposed the 
motion by relying solely on the law of the case doctrine. He 
contended that the court had already implicitly decided 
that an individual could sue for damages under Title III 
because the court sent the damage suit to the jury in the 
first trial. 
 
The district court rejected Ross' law of the case argument 
stating: "the issue of whether Title III supports Ross's 
individual requests for relief has not yet been adjudicated 
by the Court." Ross v. Hotel Employees and Restaurant 
Employees Int'l Union, No. 98-1131 slip. op. at 12 (W.D. Pa. 
Jan. 12, 2000). The court noted that Ross had not asserted 
a timeliness challenge, and concluded that it had broad 
discretion to entertain the defendants' motion for summary 
judgment even though the issues had been submitted to a 
jury. Id. at 6 (citing In re Sch. Asbestos Litig., 977 F.2d 764, 
794 (3d Cir. 1992)). The court ultimately held that interests 
of judicial economy counseled in favor of adjudicating the 
summary judgment motion and granted summary 
judgment in favor of the defendants and against Ross. 
 
In doing so, the court relied on the text and legislative 
history of the LMRDA as well as relevant precedent from 
other circuit courts of appeals. The court held that Ross' 
claims were all individual in nature and that Title III of the 
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LMRDA does not allow plaintiffs to seek individual relief. Id. 
at 12-13, 16-17. Rather, the district court concluded that 
Title III was intended to protect local unions, not their 
individual members. Id. at 14. The court relied in large part 
upon Gesink v. Grand Lodge, International Ass'n of 
Machinists and Aerospace Workers, 831 F.2d 214 (10th Cir. 
1987), in stating: 
 
       the purposes listed in Title III as justifying the creation 
       of a trusteeship have nothing to do with protecting 
       union members' or employees' individual rights; rather, 
       they seek to protect locals from `corruption' or 
       `financial malpractice' of their agents and to ensure 
       that such agents comply with their obligations and 
       `otherwise carry [ ] out the legitimate objects of ' the 
       union. 
 
Ross, slip. op. at 12. The court concluded that Ross' claim 
was not appropriately brought under Title III because each 
form of requested relief was intended to compensate him, 
not his Local. 
 
       Plaintiff 's requests for lost wages, medical insurance 
       coverage, and other `out of pocket costs' associated 
       with his termination as business agent, as well as his 
       request for reinstatement, are asserted on his own 
       behalf and for his own benefit, not for that of Local 57. 
 
Id. at 16-17. The district court did acknowledge that Ross 
sought other equitable relief including a declaration that 
the Trusteeship was improperly imposed in bad faith and 
the voiding of certain of the Trustee's actions. Id. at 17 n.3.8 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. The district court also discussed Ross' repeated attempts to invalidate 
the August 1998 election despite its previous ruling that Ross was 
barred from seeking to effect a change in the election. The district court 
reaffirmed its previous ruling that it lacked jurisdiction to entertain 
this 
part of Ross' claim. Ross v. Hotel Employees and Restaurant Employees 
Int'l Union, No. 98-1131 slip. op. at 7-8 (W.D. Pa. Jan. 12, 2000). The 
court reasoned that Title IV of the LMRDA vests the Secretary of Labor 
with exclusive jurisdiction over an individual union member's post- 
election suits regardless of when members first seek relief regarding 
elections. See id. at 8-10 (citing Local No. 82, Furniture & Piano Moving, 
Furniture Store Drivers, Helpers, Warehousemen & Packers v. Crowley, 
467 U.S. 526, 541, 544 (1984)). Post-election relief to invalidate 
elections 
or seek new elections must first be pursued with the Secretary of Labor. 
Id. at 11 n. 2. Therefore, Ross "[was] barred from pursuing claims 
requiring an invalidation of the August 1998 election." Id. at 10-11. 
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However, inasmuch as that relief was ancillary to Ross' 
primary attempt to redress his individual injuries, Ross' 
entire case was dismissed. This appeal followed. 9 
 
II. Jurisdiction and Standard of Review 
 
The district court had jurisdiction pursuant toS 304 of 
the LMRDA. 73 Stat. 519 S 304, 29 U.S.C. S 464. We have 
jurisdiction from the district court's final order granting 
summary judgment under 28 U.S.C. S 1291. We exercise 
plenary review. Resolution Trust Corp. v. Fidelity and 
Deposit Co. of Maryland, 205 F.3d 615, 626 (3d Cir. 2000). 
 
III. Discussion 
 
Ross' appeal presents two questions for resolution. First, 
we must determine if Ross has waived the arguments he 
makes now because he did not raise those arguments in 
opposition to the defendants' summary judgment motion in 
the district court. If we address the merits of his claim we 
must decide the very important question of whether Title III 
of the LMRDA affords Ross a cause of action under the 
circumstances of this case. 
 
A. Waiver 
 
As noted above, Ross' opposition to the defendants' 
motion for summary judgment in the district court was 
limited to his contention that the law of the case precluded 
summary judgment because the merits of his claim had 
been submitted to a jury. The district court disagreed with 
his position, and that ruling has not been appealed. On 
appeal, for the first time, he argues the merits of the 
defendants' claim that Title III of the LMRDA does not 
provide a cause of action for individual relief. 
 
Generally, "absent compelling circumstances an appellate 
court will not consider issues that are raised for the first 
time on appeal." Patterson v. Cuyler, 729 F.2d 925, 929 (3d 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
9. Ross does not now challenge the district court's denial of his 
assertion 
that the law of the case precluded entry of summary judgment, or the 
district court's refusal to overturn the union's election. 
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Cir. 1984), overruled on other grounds recognized in Carter 
v. Rafferty, 826 F.2d 1299 (3d Cir. 1987) (citing Singleton v. 
Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 120-21 (1976)). In Patterson, we 
explained: 
 
       This prudential policy seeks to insure that litigants 
       have every opportunity to present their evidence in the 
       forum designed to resolve factual disputes. By 
       requiring parties to present all their legal issues to the 
       district court as well, we preserve the hierarchical 
       nature of the federal courts and encourage ultimate 
       settlement before appeal. It also prevents surprise on 
       appeal and gives the appellate court the benefit of the 
       legal analysis of the trial court. It is however not a 
       jurisdictional bar, and the statement of policy permits 
       exceptions in appropriate cases. 
 
Id. (citations omitted). 
 
The case at bar has important implications for the field 
of labor law, and raises a question of first impression in 
this circuit. Moreover, the procedural posture also raises 
procedural questions that we have not previously 
addressed. As noted above, the summary judgment motion 
was made after a jury deadlocked and a mistrial was 
declared. However, because of that unique procedural 
posture, the defendants can hardly claim at this late date 
that Ross' assertion of a private cause of action under Title 
III is a surprise, or that Ross' position prejudices them. 
They have obviously assumed that he had a private cause 
of action under Title III throughout the course of this 
litigation including trial. Although Ross failed to respond to 
the merits of defendants' arguments in the summary 
judgment motion, the district court was afforded the rare 
advantage of a fully developed record in analyzing the 
issues raised by the motion for summary judgment. 
Inasmuch as the defendants are not unfairly prejudiced by 
the lateness of Ross' arguments, and given the importance 
of the issues raised by this grant of summary judgment, we 
think it appropriate to resolve this appeal on the merits, 
and not upon the procedural grounds that the defendants 
argue in the alternative. 
 
Moreover, the district court did not err in considering a 
motion for summary judgment after a mistrial. If there are 
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no issues of material fact and a party is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law, judgment may be awarded at 
any time, even after trial, under Rule 56 or under Rule 50. 
There was no reason to require the court to go through the 
procedural calisthenics of a second trial merely because the 
motion for judgment was brought after the mistrial. 
Accordingly, we will consider the merits of the arguments 
before us. 
 
B. Title III of the LMRDA 
 
This dispute arises in the context of a trusteeship that 
was imposed pursuant to Title III of the LMRDA. 10 The 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
10. Title III of the LMRDA provides in relevant part: 
 
 S 302 Purposes for which a trusteeship may be established 
 
Trusteeships shall be established and administered by a labor 
organization over a subordinate body only in accordance with the 
constitution and bylaws of the organization which has assumed 
trusteeship over the subordinate body and for the purpose of correcting 
corruption or financial malpractice, assuring the performance of 
collective bargaining agreements or other duties of bargaining 
representative, restoring democratic procedures, or otherwise carrying 
out the legitimate objects of such labor organization. 
 
S 303 Unlawful acts relating to labor organization under 
trusteeship 
 
(a) During any period when a subordinate body of a labor organization 
is in trusteeship, it shall be unlawful (1) to count the vote of delegates 
from such body in any convention or election of officers of the labor 
organization unless the delegates have been chosen by secret ballot in 
an election in which all the members in good standing of such 
subordinate body were eligible to participate . . . 
 * * * 
 
S 304 Enforcement 
 
(a) Upon the written complaint of any member or subordinate body of 
a labor organization alleging that such organization has violated the 
provisions of this title (except section 301) the Secretary shall 
investigate 
the complaint and if the Secretary finds probable cause to believe that 
such violation has occurred and has not been remedied he shall, without 
disclosing the identity of the complainant, bring a civil action in any 
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LMRDA defines a trusteeship as "any receivership . . . or 
other method of supervision or control whereby a labor 
organization suspends the autonomy otherwise available to 
a subordinate body under its constitution or bylaws." 73 
Stat. 519 S 3(h), 29 U.S.C. S 402(h). Title III limits the 
establishment of trusteeships as follows: 
 
       `Trusteeships shall be established and administered 
       . . . for the purpose of [1] correcting corruption or 
       financial malpractice, [2] assuring the performance of 
       collective bargaining agreements or other duties of a 
       bargaining representative, [3] restoring democratic 
       procedures, [4] or otherwise carrying out the legitimate 
       objects of such labor organization. 
 
73 Stat. 519 S 302, 29 U.S.C. S 462. Specifying proper 
purposes protects the local union organization and its 
membership as a whole from the misuse of the trusteeship 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
district court of the United States having jurisdiction of the labor 
organization for such relief (including injunctions) as may be 
appropriate. Any member or subordinate body of a labor organization 
affected by any violation of this title (except section 301) may bring a 
civil action in any district court of the United States having 
jurisdiction 
of the labor organization for such relief (including injunctions) as may 
be 
appropriate. 
 
* * * 
 
(c) In any proceeding pursuant to this section a trusteeship established 
by a labor organization in conformity with the procedural requirements 
of its constitution and bylaws and authorized or ratified after a fair 
hearing . . . shall be presumed valid for a period of eighteen months from 
the date of its establishment and shall not be subject to attack during 
such period except upon clear and convincing proof that the trusteeship 
was not established or maintained in good faith for a purpose allowable 
under section 302. After the expiration of eighteen months the 
trusteeship shall be presumed invalid in any such proceeding and its 
discontinuance shall be decreed unless the labor organization shall show 
by clear and convincing proof that the continuation of the trusteeship is 
necessary for a purpose allowable under section 302. In the latter event 
the court may dismiss the complaint or retain jurisdiction of the cause 
on such conditions and for such period as it deems appropriate. 
 
73 Stat. 519 SS 301, 302, 303, 304, 29 U.S.C.SS 461, 462, 463, 464. 
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power. Title III provides that a trusteeship is"presumed 
valid for a period of eighteen months . . . and shall not be 
subject to attack during such period except upon clear and 
convincing proof that the trusteeship was not established 
or maintained in good faith for a purpose allowable under 
section 302." 73 Stat. 519 S 304(c), 29 U.S.C. S 464(c). The 
provision also states: "[a]ny member or subordinate body of 
a labor organization affected by a violation of this title may 
bring a civil action in any district court . . . for such relief 
(including injunctions) as may be appropriate." 73 Stat. 519 
S 304(a), 29 U.S.C. S 464(a). It is this provision that 
provides the proverbial "rub" here, as we must determine if 
the individual relief that Ross is seeking is "appropriate" 
under Title III.11 
 
Our inquiry is therefore circumscribed by our 
interpretation of this statute. 
 
       In any case turning on statutory interpretation, our 
       goal is to ascertain the intent of Congress. To 
       accomplish this goal, we begin by looking at the 
       statute's language. If the language is plain, we need 
       look no further. If the statutory language is ambiguous 
       or unclear, we may look behind the language to the 
       legislative history for guidance. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
11. At oral argument, and vaguely in his brief, Ross argued that we 
should read the enforcement section of Title III in light of S 401 which 
is 
the introduction section of the LMRDA and discusses the purposes and 
policy of the LMRDA. S 401(b) discusses protecting the rights of 
employees and the public in general: 
 
       The Congress further finds, from recent investigations in the labor 
       and management fields, that there have been a number of instances 
       of breach of trust, corruption, disregard of the rights of 
individual 
       employees, and other failures to observe high standards of 
       responsibility and ethical conduct which require further and 
       supplementary legislation that will afford necessary protection of 
the 
       rights and interests of employees and the public generally as they 
       relate to the activities of labor organizations, employers, labor 
       relations consultants, and their officers and representatives. 
 
73 Stat. 519 S 2(b), 29 U.S.C. S 401(b). Ross contends that this section's 
use of the word "employees" indicates that protecting employees of the 
union was the underlying purpose of the LMRDA. For reasons we 
discuss below, we disagree. 
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Collinsgru v. Palmyra Bd. of Educ., 161 F.3d 225, 233 (3d 
Cir. 1998). The intricate legislative history of the LMRDA 
has caused the Supreme Court to note that: 
 
       Archibald Cox, who actively participated in shaping 
       much of the LMRDA, has remarked: 
 
       `The legislation contains more than its share of 
       problems for judicial interpretation because much of 
       the bill was written on the floor of the Senate or 
       House of Representatives and because many sections 
       contain calculated ambiguities or political 
       compromises essential to secure a majority. 
       Consequently, in resolving them the courts would be 
       well advised to seek out the underlying rationale 
       without placing great emphasis upon close 
       construction of the words.' 
 
Wirtz, 389 U.S. at 468 n.6 (citing Cox, Internal Affairs of 
Labor Unions Under the Labor Reform Act of 1959, 58 
Mich. L. Rev. 819, 852 (1960)). Thus the practice of 
interpreting ambiguous statutory language in light of its 
legislative history is of particular value in the context of the 
LMRDA. Although we do not consider the word 
"appropriate" an ambiguous term in and of itself, to the 
extent that the text of the LMRDA does not adequately 
define the term in context, and thereby definitively 
establish what remedies are "appropriate" under Title III, 
we are compelled to consult the statute's legislative history. 
See West Virginia Univ. Hospital, Inc. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 
98 (1991) (it is appropriate to resort to legislative history to 
determine the meaning of ambiguous legislation). The 
legislative history of Title III confirms our analysis. 
 
C. The Legislative History of Title III 
 
In 1957, the Select Committee on Improper Activities in 
the Labor Management Field of the United States Senate, 
more commonly known as the "McClellan Committee," 
began investigating and gathering findings on the internal 
affairs of labor unions. Note, Landrum-Griffin and the 
Trusteeship Imbroglio, 71 Yale L.J. 1460, 1473 (1962) 
(hereinafter "Note, Trusteeship Imbroglio"). The McClellan 
Committee's findings "exposed the details of the sad state of 
 
                                13 
 
 
 
democracy in large sections of the labor movement and 
provided numerous examples of the abuses of the 
trusteeship power." Sheet Metal Workers' Int'l Ass'n v. 
Lynn, 488 U.S. 347, 357 n. 8 (1998) (quoting Note, 
Trusteeship Imbroglio at 1473). 
 
       The Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act 
       of 1959 was the product of congressional concern with 
       widespread abuses of power by union leadership. The 
       relevant provisions of the Act had a history tracing 
       back more than two decades in the evolution of the 
       statutes relating to labor unions. Tensions between 
       union leaders and the rank-and-file members and 
       allegations of union wrongdoing led to extended 
       congressional inquiry. As originally introduced, the 
       legislation focused on disclosure requirements and the 
       regulation of union trusteeships and elections. 
       However, various amendments were adopted, all aimed 
       at enlarged protection for members of unions 
       paralleling certain rights guaranteed by the Federal 
       Constitution; not surprisingly, these amendments-- 
       ultimately enacted as Title I of the Act, 29 U.S.C. 
       SS 411-415--were introduced under the title of "Bill of 
       Rights of Members of Labor Organizations." The 
       amendments placed emphasis on the rights of union 
       members to freedom of expression without fear of 
       sanctions by the union, which in many instances could 
       mean loss of union membership and in turn loss of 
       livelihood. Such protection was necessary to further 
       the Act's primary objective of ensuring that unions 
       would be democratically governed and responsive to 
       the will of their memberships. 
 
Id. at 352 (citing 105 Cong. Rec. 6471-6472, 6476, 15530 
(1959)). 
 
Title III of the LMRDA, the trusteeship title, first emerged 
as Title II12 of the Kennedy-Ives Bill passed by the Senate in 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
12. A review of the Senate Report no. 187, April 14, 1959 [To accompany 
S. 1555] in the Section-By-Section Analysis reveals that Title I was 
originally the reporting provision and Title II was the trusteeship 
provision. U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News at 2352 - 2362. Later, Title 
I became the Bill of Rights provision, Title II became the reporting 
provision and Title III became the trusteeship provision. 73 Stat. 519 S1 
et seq., 29 U.S.C. S 401 et seq. 
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June of 1958. Lynn, 488 U.S. at 357 n.8. It appeared again 
in January of 1959 in the Kennedy-Ervin Bill. Id.; Note, 
Trusteeship Imbroglio at 1475. The Kennedy-Ervin Bill 
focused on disclosure and reporting requirements, 
trusteeships and elections. U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 
at 2318-72; Lynn, 488 U.S. at 352. The accompanying 
Committee Report to the Kennedy-Ervin Bill reflects the 
overarching concern of guaranteeing internal union 
democracy while minimizing governmental interference with 
the internal affairs of unions. See, e.g., 1959 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
at 2322-23; Jerry E. Linde, Title III of the Labor or 
Management Relations and Disclosure Act: For Greater 
Judicial Protection of Union Democracy and Local Automony, 
9 J. Corp. L. 271, 276-80 (1984); Marcia Greenblatt, Union 
Officials and the Labor Bill of Rights, 57 Fordham L. Rev. 
601, 601-02 (1989). This report acknowledged that 
trusteeships had been effective in the past "to insure order 
within [labor] organizations." U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. 
News at 2333. However, it also acknowledged the McClellan 
Committee's findings regarding the misuse of the 
trusteeship authority. The Committee Report noted: 
 
       in some instances trusteeships have been used as a 
       means of consolidating the power of corrupt union 
       officers, plundering and dissipating the resources of 
       local unions, and preventing the growth of competing 
       political elements within the organization. 
 
Lynn, 488 U.S. at 357 n. 8 (quoting 1959 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 
2333). The Committee Report also explained why then 
current law was ineffective: 
 
       A trusteeship will ordinarily be set aside unless the 
       local is given a fair hearing including notice of the 
       charges and an opportunity to defend. But if the forms 
       of fair procedure are observed there appears to be little 
       the courts can do and there are very few cases staying 
       or upsetting trusteeships upon substantive grounds. 
       Men have frequently been subjected to fines as large as 
       $1,000 for bringing suit against a union; others have 
       been expelled from the membership. 
 
       The Committee on Labor and Public Welfare therefore 
       concurs in the select committee's recommendation that 
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       there should be a `limitation on the right of 
       internationals to place local unions in trusteeship.' 
 
U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News at 2333. 
 
The Kennedy-Ervin Bill underwent seven months of 
rewriting and debate involving several amendments. Note, 
Trusteeship Imbroglio, at 1475. A major alteration was the 
addition of a "Bill of Rights of Members of Labor 
Organizations." Id. The Bill of Rights"was adopted as an 
amendment on the Senate floor by `legislators[who] feared 
that the [original] bill did not go far enough because it did 
not provide general protection to union members who spoke 
out against union leadership.' " Lynn, 488 U.S. at 352 
(quoting Steelworkers v. Sadlowski, 457 U.S. 102 (1982)). 
Those legislators believed this Bill of Rights was needed to 
further protect the rank-and-file members and reinforce the 
other provisions of the LMRDA, including the trusteeship 
provision. 
 
In these debates, Senator McClellan stated: 
 
       I do not believe that racketeering, corruption, abuse of 
       power and other improper practices on the part of 
       some labor organizations can be, or will ever be, 
       prevented until and unless the Congress of the United 
       States has the wisdom and the courage to enact laws 
       prescribing minimum standards of democratic process 
       and conduct for the administration of internal union 
       affairs. I mean by that, . . . that the Congress should 
       prescribe and define by law what the rights of union 
       members are, place in them by democratic process the 
       power to secure those rights and protect them in their 
       efforts to do so from reprisals of any kind from their 
       would-be exploiters, manipulators, and bosses. Without 
       such protection, other provisions of law may be of little 
       benefit and meaningless. Without such protection in 
       the exercise of his legitimate rights the records of our 
       committee's investigations show over and over again 
       that a rank-and-file member dare not risk any 
       opposition to a corrupt or autocratic leadership. If he 
       does so, he may be beaten, his family threatened, his 
       property destroyed or damaged, and he may be forced 
       out of his job--all of these can happen and have 
       happened. 
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        Having these things in mind, . . . I introduced S. 1137 
       to provide a bill of rights for working people--for union 
       members. 
 
105 Cong. Rec. 6471-72 (emphasis added). 
 
The Bill of Rights was therefore "[d]esigned to guarantee 
every member equal voting rights, rights of free speech and 
assembly, and a right to sue." Lynn, 488 U.S. at 352 
(quoting Steelworkers v. Sadlowski, 457 U.S. 102 (1982)). 
 
Between January and September of 1959, when the 
LMRDA was finally enacted, most of the debate concerned 
the new additions and amendments, "while the trusteeship 
title glided quietly through the labyrinthine process from 
bill to bill with little change and less discussion." See Lynn, 
488 U.S. at 357 n.8 (quoting Note, Trusteeship Imbroglio at 
1475). Neither the discussions on the House nor Senate 
floors focused on the relationship between Title I and Title 
III. Id. Senator Dodd, however, did propose an amendment 
to Title III which sparked some debate. Specifically, Dodd 
wanted the trusteeship provisions to go even further in 
order to prevent the manipulation of the trusteeship power 
and the resulting harm that had been so well documented 
by the McClellan Committee. Note, Trusteeship Imbroglio at 
1475-76. Dodd's amendment created a presumption that 
trusteeships in place longer than thirty days were invalid 
unless the international union, at a hearing before the 
Secretary of Labor, could present clear and convincing 
proof of a proper purpose. Id. Senator Dodd explained the 
rationale for his proposed amendment as follows: 
 
       The [Kennedy-Ervin] bill now provides a procedure 
       under which an individual union member may appeal. 
       The point is that the full burden of proof is placed 
       upon such union member, who thus would have to 
       fight the international or the national union; and in 
       that fight the limited, sparse, or -- most often-- 
       nonexistent power of the individual union member 
       would be pitted against the tremendous prestige and 
       power of the national or the international union. . . . 
 
       the philosophy behind my amendment is an old Anglo- 
       American philosophy . . . that the burden of proof for 
       so serious a matter as destroying a local union, or local 
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       union autonomy -- and that is what a trusteeship 
       usually does -- should rest upon the national union 
       seeking to impose the trusteeship. 
 105 Cong. Rec. at 6675. 
 
Dodd then focused on the importance of protecting the 
local membership given organized crime's entanglement 
with certain elements of the labor movement as unearthed 
during the congressional inquiry. He explained: 
 
       In the past, as we know from the revelations of the 
       McClellan committee, and as we know from litigation, 
       the imposition of trusteeships was one of the greatest 
       abuses of the Teamsters Union. My recollection is that 
       more than 120 trusteeships were imposed by that 
       union some of them for more than 20 years. Think of 
       it. For more than 20 years, the local members, the 
       wage earners, were without any say at all with respect 
       to their local unions. 
 
* * * 
 
       All I seek by the amendment is to give the members of 
       a local union an opportunity to say to someone, a 
       judge, or other competent authority, `This trusteeship 
       should not be imposed on us.' 
 
Id. (emphasis added). 
 
Senator Ervin opposed Dodd's amendment. Ervin argued 
"the bill as now drawn furnishes adequate protection for 
the rank and file of members of unions which are placed in 
trusteeship."13 Id. at 6677. Additionally, Senator Morse 
argued: 
 
       [W]e should look at the trustee section of the bill as it 
       comes to us in the light of the other sections of the bill, 
       and note what the committee has done by way of 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
13. Part of Ervin's discussion specifically explained that the bill "takes 
care of the main reason why trusteeships are sometimes arbitrarily 
imposed, namely, to enable international officers to control the selection 
of delegates to international conventions. The bill contains a specific 
provision to the effect that the local union in trusteeship may be 
represented at an international convention only by delegates elected by 
a secret ballot of the members of the local." 105 Cong. Rec. 6677. 
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       setting up democratic procedures to protect the rank 
       and file of the local unions. As we provide democratic 
       guarantees in the bill, I believe we should keep at a 
       minimum any interference with the operation of the 
       internal affairs of the union. 
 
Lynn, 488 U.S. at 357 n. 8 (quoting 105 Cong. Rec. 6678). 
Dodd's amendment was subsequently rejected. 
 
When the Kennedy-Ervin Bill went to the House, the 
enforcement section of the trusteeship title was changed.14 
The Kennedy-Ervin Bill did not grant individual union 
members standing to bring suit in federal court. The 
Committee Report accompanying the bill explained that 
"section 206 makes clear that Federal suits under Title II 
are possible only upon suit initiated by the Secretary of 
Labor." U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 1959, p. 2363. The 
enforcement section which Congress passed, and which is 
still in force, allows the local union itself or an individual 
union member to bring suit in federal court. See  73 Stat. 
519 S, 29 U.S.C. S 464. 
 
The legislative history is silent on the issue of whether a 
union member, as an appointed officer, may seek individual 
damages. However, Congressman Ludwig Teller offered 
supplementary views regarding the reasoning behind the 
amendment of the enforcement section. Teller explained 
that Congress wanted to facilitate individual claims without 
any involvement by the Secretary. U.S. Code Cong. & 
Admin. News 1959, p. 2500. This allowed Congress to 
curtail the inordinate power of the Secretary while saving 
taxpayer dollars and eliminating any requirement that a 
union member first obtain governmental permission to sue.15 
Id. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
14. The enforcement provision currently in force is S 304 of the LMRDA, 
29 U.S.C. S 464. 
 
15. Congressman Teller stated: 
 
       HR 8342 is a substantial improvement over S. 1555 (the Kennedy- 
       Ervin bill), the Senate-passed labor management reform bill which 
       our committee used as a basis for its deliberations.. . . Reducing 
       the excessive powers of the Secretary of Labor, as we did in our 
       committee bill H.R. 8342, is in line with our traditions which 
favor 
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This expansive discussion of legislative history does not 
conclusively establish what type of relief is "appropriate" for 
an individual union member who is also an appointed 
official. However, it places that inquiry into its proper 
context and guides our interpretation of the relevant 
statutory language. In interpreting Title III in the context of 
the discussions in Congress and the findings of the 
McClellan Committee, we conclude that the amendment 
authorizing individual law suits was intended to underscore 
the concerns surrounding trusteeships under Title III. By 
allowing individual members to bring suit rather than the 
Secretary, Congress intended more avenues for enforcement 
of the trusteeship provision, not more types of relief. 
 
Nothing in the legislative history of Title III suggests that 
Congress contemplated an individual bringing suit for 
compensatory damages arising from the loss of an 
appointed union position under that title. The statutory 
scheme of the LMRDA strongly suggests that the individual 
rights that Ross seeks to vindicate must be redressed under 
Title I. As noted above, that provision was initially referred 
to as the "workers' bill of rights" when it was introduced. 
Title III, which came first, was meant to protect the 
subordinate labor organization, and Title I was 
subsequently added specifically to address the rights of 
individual union members. Accordingly, we conclude from 
the legislative history that the relief that Ross seeks is not 
"appropriate" under Title III. An examination of the relevant 
cases confirms this conclusion. 
 
D. Applicable Case Law 
 
We have not previously interpreted S 304, the 
enforcement provision of Title III. However, Finnegan v. Leu, 
456 U.S. 431 (1982), and its progeny guide our analysis. In 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
       the diffusion of power, will save the taxpayer many millions of 
       dollars annually without impairing the basic objectives of the 
       proposed law, and will permit individuals to prosecute their own 
       cases in the courts without having to obtain permission of a 
       Government agent or official to do so. 
 
U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 1959, p. 2500. 
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Finnegan, Leu defeated Brown in an election for president 
of Local 20 of the International Brotherhood of the 
Teamsters. Id. at 433. Brown had been openly supported by 
a group of the local's business agents including Finnegan. 
Id. After Leu assumed office, he discharged all of the 
business agents who had supported Brown pursuant to a 
provision in the local's bylaws that purported to give the 
president the "authority to appoint, . . and discharge the 
Union's business agents." Id. at 433. The business agents 
then sued in district court contending that their 
termination violated Title I of the LMRDA.16 Id. 
 The Court began its analysis by reviewing the legislative 
history of the LMRDA, and concluding that "the Act's 
primary objective [was] ensuring that unions would be 
democratically governed and responsive to the will of their 
memberships." Id. The Court noted that"[i]t is readily 
apparent from the legislative history of Title I, that it was 
rank-and-file union members--not union officers or 
employees, as such--whom Congress sought to protect." Id. 
at 437. The plaintiffs were members of the union with 
protected speech rights, as well as salaried employees of 
the union. Accordingly, the Court had to determine whether 
the rights afforded plaintiffs as members of the union 
"immunized [them] from discharge at the pleasure of the 
president from their positions as appointed union 
employees." Id. 
 
The Court concluded that the plaintiffs' Title I rights had 
not been violated because plaintiffs had not been precluded 
from exercising any of those rights, and the LMRDA did not 
protect appointed officers who "backed the wrong horse." 
This was true even if it meant that those officers were 
"forced to `choose between their rights of free expression 
. . . and their jobs.' " Id. (citations omitted). The Court 
explained its rejection of plaintiffs' Title I claim as follows: 
 
       For whatever limits Title I places on a union's authority 
       to utilize dismissal from union office as `part of a 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
16. The suit was filed under LMRDA SS 101(a) (1) and (2) which 
"guarantee equal voting rights, and rights of speech and assembly, to 
`[e]very member of a labor organization.' " Id. at 436 (quoting 29 U.S.C. 
S 411 (1998)). 
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       purposeful and deliberate attempt . . . to suppress 
       dissent within the union,' (citations omitted), it does 
       not restrict the freedom of an elected union leader to 
       choose a staff whose views are compatible with his 
       own. Indeed, neither the language nor legislative 
       history of the Act suggest that it was intended to 
       address the issue of union patronage. To the contrary, 
       the Act's overriding objective was to ensure that unions 
       would be democratically governed, and responsive to 
       the will of the union membership as expressed in open, 
       periodic elections. 
 
Id. at 441. 
 
Here, Ross also held the "dual status" of union member 
and appointed union officer. Defendants argue that because 
Ross was employed during the entire time the trusteeship 
was in place, Finnegan precludes him from asserting a 
claim "arising from the decision of the newly elected officers 
of Local 57 not to retain him as a business agent after the 
trusteeship ended." Defendants' Br. at 9. Defendants are 
correct that the newly elected officers of Local 57 were free 
"to choose a staff whose views are compatible with [their] 
own." Finnegan, 456 U.S. at 441. 
 
However, the analysis does not end there because, unlike 
in Finnegan, we are here concerned with a trusteeship that 
was created pursuant to Title III. Ross argues he is entitled 
to compensation because the continuation of the 
Trusteeship was in bad faith and for the purpose of 
removing him as political opposition within Local 57 in 
violation of S 304 of Title III.17  The Supreme Court 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
17. There is some confusion about Ross' position regarding whether the 
Trusteeship was appropriately created and/or maintained. Defendants 
quote Ross as having conceded that the Trusteeship"was appropriate 
and was imposed for a proper purpose." See  Defendants' Br. at 2. 
However, we do not interpret Ross' testimony as a concession. Rather, he 
was asked if he was aware of the serious charges facing the officers of 
the union and whether such serious charges justify establishing a 
Trusteeship. He responded, "[w]ell, according to the International, that's 
the way they feel. But, I think we should have been spoke [sic] to first. 
. . . I do believe that is a valid reason for an International to come in 
and 
take over." App. at 250. Ross did not necessarily concede, however, that 
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addressed a similar argument in the context of a 
trusteeship in Sheet Metal Workers' International Ass'n v. 
Lynn, 488 U.S. 347 (1989). 
 
There, the trustee who had been appointed to run the 
local asked Lynn, who was an elected business 
representative of Local 75, to support a proposed dues 
increase. However, rather than support the increase, Lynn 
insisted that expenditures be reduced and he organized the 
opposition to the proposal to raise union dues. Id. at 349- 
50. Five days after the proposal was defeated, the trustee 
informed Lynn that he was being removed from his elected 
position of business agent. Id. at 350. Lynn exhausted his 
administrative remedies within the union, and then filed 
suit under Title I alleging that his removal constituted 
illegal retaliation in violation of the statutory right of free 
speech set forth in S 101(a)(2) of the LMRDA. 73 Stat. 519 
S 101(a)(2), 29 U.S.C. S 411(a)(2). 
 The Court began its analysis by noting similarities 
between Lynn's plight, and the plight of the plaintiffs in 
Finnegan. The Court recalled that the Title I rights of the 
plaintiffs in Finnegan had been chilled"albeit indirectly, 
because [they] had been forced to choose between their 
rights and their jobs." Id., at 354. Nevertheless, the 
Finnegan plaintiffs had not recovered because the choice 
that they were left with did not violate the purpose of the 
LMRDA. 
 
       Whether such interference with Title I rights gives rise 
       to a cause of action under S 102 must be judged by 
       reference to the LMRDA's basic objective: "to ensure 
       that unions [are] democratically governed, and 
       responsive to the will of the union membership as 
       expressed in open, periodic elections." In Finnegan, this 
       goal was furthered when the newly elected union 
       president discharged the appointed staff of the ousted 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
the actual motivation for taking over was the justification asserted by 
the 
International. Moreover, even if he may have conceded the Trusteeship 
was established for a legitimate purpose, he clearly insists that it was 
maintained for an improper purpose, and that he has a cause of action 
under Title III as a result. 
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       incumbent. Indeed, the basis for the Finnegan  holding 
       was the recognition that the newly elected president's 
       victory might be rendered meaningless if a disloyal staff 
       were able to thwart the implementation of his 
       programs. While such patronage-related discharges 
       had some chilling effect on the free speech rights of the 
       business agents, we found this concern outweighed by 
       the need to vindicate the democratic choice made by 
       the union electorate. 
 
488 U.S. at 354-5 (citations omitted). However, the Court 
stressed that Lynn's situation was quite different for he was 
removed from an elected position, and his removal thereby 
had a direct impact on the democratic governance of the 
union itself. 
 
       The consequences of the removal of an elected official 
       are much different. To begin with, when an elected 
       official like Lynn is removed from his post, the union 
       members are denied the representative of their choice. 
       Indeed, Lynn's removal deprived the membership of his 
       leadership, knowledge, and advice at a critical time for 
       the Local. His removal, therefore, hardly was an 
       integral part of ensuring a union administration's 
       responsiveness to the mandate of the union election. 
 
        Furthermore, the potential chilling effect on Title I 
       free speech rights is more pronounced when elected 
       officials are discharged. Not only is the fired official 
       likely to be chilled in the exercise of his own free 
       speech rights, but so are the members who voted for 
       him. Seeing Lynn removed from his post just five days 
       after he led the fight to defeat yet another dues 
       increase proposal, other members of the Local may well 
       have concluded that one challenged the union's 
       hierarchy, if at all, at one's peril. This is precisely what 
       Congress sought to prevent when it passed the 
       LMRDA. "It recognized that democracy would be 
       assured only if union members are free to discuss 
       union policies and criticize the leadership without fear 
       of reprisal." 
 
Id. at 355. Accordingly, the Court held that Lynn's 
allegation of retaliatory removal stated a cause of action 
under Title I of the LMRDA. 
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Ross was appointed and his complaint alleges only a 
violation of Title III.18 The Court in Lynn was quite explicit 
in tying Lynn's cause of action to Title I. The Court 
emphasized the importance of Title I as follows: 
 
       we find nothing in the language of the LMRDA or its 
       legislative history to suggest that Congress intended 
       Title I rights to fall by the wayside whenever a 
       trusteeship is imposed. Had Congress contemplated 
       such a result, we would expect to find some discussion 
       of it in the text of the LMRDA or its legislative history. 
       Given Congress' silence on this point, a trustee's 
       authority under Title III ordinarily should be construed 
       in a manner consistent with the protections provided in 
       Title I. 
 
Id. at 356-57. 
 
Title I was enacted to protect rank-and-file members of 
the union and to insure union democracy by protecting the 
independence of elected union officials even though the free 
speech rights of the union's membership are implicated. 
This is true whether or not a trusteeship is involved. Ross 
tries to avail himself of the holding in Lynn  by arguing that 
his removal has an impact on the democratic governance of 
the Local.19 He seems to be arguing that Title III was the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
18. Ross' brief states: 
 
       As a result of the improper use of a trusteeship, Ross suffered 
direct 
       or proximate damages. But for the imposition of the trusteeship, 
       Ross still would be employed. Since the trusteeship was intended 
for 
       an improper purpose and maintained in bad faith, the Defendants 
       violated the LMRDA. Ross, as a member of Local 57, was "affected" 
       by the violation of the LMRDA. The damages requested were 
       "appropriate" to make him whole. 
 
Ross' Brief at 23 (emphasis added). 
 
19. Ross' brief states: 
 
       The actions of the International Union will have also a chilling 
affect 
       on all members of Local 57. If the International Union succeeds in 
       destroying Ross and leaving him with no recourse, then other 
       members will refrain from opposing the International Union. On the 
       other hand, if the International Union is required to defend Ross' 
       action and to compensate him for its misuse of the trusteeship, 
then 
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mechanism by which his free speech rights (i.e., Title I) 
were violated. However, the rights that may have been 
chilled are nevertheless Title I rights, not Title III rights. 
Therefore, the holding in Lynn does not further his position. 
"The potential chilling effect on Title I free speech rights is 
more pronounced when elected officials are discharged. Not 
only is the fired official likely to be chilled in the exercise of 
his own free speech rights, but so are the members who 
voted for him." Id. at 355. We are not persuaded by Ross' 
attempts to secure compensation for a claimed violation of 
Title I under Title III. His position is, in fact, in substantial 
tension with Finnegan. After all, in Finnegan, the Court 
allowed an appointed officer to be removed even though 
doing so required employees to chose between free speech 
and continued employment. The Court reasoned that choice 
was necessarily concomitant to allowing elected officials to 
implement the programs and leadership that a majority of 
the union membership had voted for. Although there was 
no issue of a trusteeship in Finnegan, it is very difficult to 
square that analysis with Ross' assertion that he has a 
cause of action because of the Trusteeship here. 
 
As the Supreme Court found in the Title I setting, 
nothing in the legislative history of Title III establishes that 
Congress intended to protect appointed officers like Ross 
under the circumstances here. Ross' reliance upon Title III 
may well be an attempt to circumvent the holding in 
Finnegan. But for the existence of the Trusteeship and the 
fact that Ross brought this suit under Title III, Finnegan 
would be more precisely on point. Ross' claim that he was 
victimized by an appointed Trustee rather than an elected 
officer does not alter the fact that the rights he seeks to 
vindicate are Title I rights, not Title III rights. Accordingly, 
we believe our analysis here must still be guided by 
Finnegan, and that is confirmed by our reading of Gesink v. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
       the International Union will think twice before using a trusteeship 
       as a means to harm one of its members. In this respect, Ross' 
       actions benefit all members and inure to the benefit of the 
       `subordinate body of a labor organization' in addition to himself. 
 
Ross' brief at 23 (emphasis added). 
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Grand Lodge, International Ass'n of Machinists and 
Aerospace Workers, 831 F.2d 214, 216 (10th Cir. 1987). 
 
In Gesink, the International appointed a trustee who 
subsequently filed charges against Gesink, a business 
representative for the local. Id. at 215. Gesink was 
thereafter removed from his office by the president of the 
International, and he was barred from holding any office for 
five years. Id. Gesink sued for damages under Title I and 
Title III. His claim for damages under Title III was based 
upon his assertion that he was entitled to relief for 
deprivation of his salary and other emoluments of his office 
during the Grand Lodge supervision of the District Lodge. 
He argued that the supervision violated Title III of the 
LMRDA. Id. at 216. The Court dismissed his Title III claim 
stating: 
 
       In light of the legislative history of Title III of the 
       LMRDA and the Supreme Court's ruling in Finnegan , 
       this Court finds that there is no cause of action for 
       individual damages under SS 462 and 464. Any right of 
       action pursuant to those sections belongs to the 
       subordinate union, while a union member may sue to 
       enforce the act's provisions, such suits should be 
       limited to relief on behalf of the union. As the Supreme 
       Court concluded in the Title I context, this Court 
       concludes that nothing in the legislative history of Title 
       III indicates an intent to protect the positions of union 
       officers and employees. 
 Id., at 216. Similarly, in Pope v. Office and Professional 
Employees International Union, the court stated:"Title III of 
the LMRDA is designed to protect a subordinate union as 
a whole, whereas Title I . . . is designed to protect the 
individual rights of the members of a union." 74 F.3d 1492, 
1504, (6th Cir. 1996). 
 
The district court here found that Ross is not seeking 
compensatory damages and reinstatement in order to 
protect the local union and its membership from the 
actions of the Trustee. Rather, the court concluded that 
Ross sought relief to redress personal losses purportedly 
inflicted upon him by the Trustee. Ross v. Hotel Employees 
and Restaurant Employees Int'l Union, No. 98-1131, slip. 
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op. at 16-17 (W.D. Pa. Oct. 4, 1999). His efforts to now 
argue that his relief will benefit the union by vindicating its 
members' free speech rights is little more than a belated 
attempt to import considerations that govern Title I relief 
into a suit brought only under Title III. 
 
Despite the holding in Finnegan, Lynn , and Gesink, Ross 
urges that we be guided by Higgins v. Harden, 644 F.2d 
1348 (9th Cir. 1981). There, the International Association of 
Machinists ("IAM") appointed Simpson and Harden to 
exercise control over a local for which Higgins was an 
organizer. Thereafter, Harden attempted to remove Higgins 
from his position as organizer by claiming that Higgins had 
been unproductive. Higgins responded by suing under 
SS 101-611 of the LMRDA, 29 U.S.C. SS 401-531. He alleged 
that the IAM had imposed an unlawful trusteeship in the 
form of Simpson and Harden, that those trustees were 
without authority to terminate him, and that his 
termination had actually been in retaliation for his political 
support of the directing business representative of the local 
who had apparently fallen into disfavor with the 
International, and been "forced out" by Harden. Id. 
 
The district court held that the International had, in fact, 
established a trusteeship. That trusteeship was declared 
invalid because the International had not complied with 
IAM's own constitution and bylaws. Accordingly, the court 
held that Harden did not have the authority to remove 
Higgins, and Higgins was awarded back-pay and attorney's 
fees. Id. The court of appeals affirmed that part of the 
district court's opinion. However, the court of appeals 
merely assumed that the requested individual relief was 
"appropriate" under Title III. 
 
We decline to embrace Higgins for several reasons. 
Although the court there assumed that an individual right 
of action exists, under Title III, it did not directly address 
the issue. See Gesink, 831 F.2d at 216 (finding that the 
Higgins court "apparently assumes there is an individual 
right of action . . . but . . . does not discuss the issue"). It 
never analyzed the legislative history that Finnegan and 
Lynn instruct is so important to a proper inquiry. Moreover, 
Higgins was decided before Finnegan and Lynn, and the 
Higgins court therefore did not have the benefit of the 
 
                                28 
 
 
 
Supreme Court's discussion of the LMRDA contained in 
those later cases. 
 
Ross also urges reliance on McDonald v. Oliver , 525 F.2d 
1217 (5th Cir. 1976). In McDonald, new elections were held 
after a trusteeship was established, but the International 
invalidated the election results and refused to install the 
new officers. Id. at 1222-23. The newly elected officers 
brought suit under Titles I and III seeking to end the 
trusteeship; and win installation as officers, and back-pay. 
Id. The Secretary also brought an action under Titles III 
and IV based on a finding by a Labor Department official 
that the continuation of the trusteeship and the failure to 
recognize the election violated Titles III and IV of the 
LMRDA. Id. at 1224. The district court declared that the 
election was valid, ordered the immediate installation of the 
officers, and awarded back pay. Id. at 1225. The Court of 
Appeals affirmed, reasoning that: 
 
       [a]lthough the primary purpose of an individual's 
       lawsuit is obviously to vindicate his own rights or 
       facilitate his own candidacy, there can be little doubt 
       that he renders a substantial service to the union as 
       an institution and to his members individually in 
       protecting local democratic processes through Titles I 
       and III. The successful litigant dispels the "chill" cast 
       upon the rights of others. 
 
Id. at 1227. The court also concluded that Title III should 
be "construed in light of the varius other provisions of the 
LMRDA." Id. at 1229. The court recognized that the primary 
purpose of the LMRDA is "not only to stop and prevent 
outrageous conduct by thugs and gangsters but also to 
stop lesser forms of objectionable conduct by those in 
positions of trust and to protect democratic processes 
within union organizations." Id. The court concluded by 
finding that the international union was thwarting union 
democracy in violation to the LMRDA. 
 
Although McDonald suggests that a successful suit under 
Title III confers benefits on the entire union membership, 
the holding does not advance Ross' argument as much as 
he would like because McDonald was also decided before 
Finnegan and Lynn. Moreover, McDonald was elected and 
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Ross was appointed. The decisions in Finnegan  and Lynn 
readily establish the importance of that distinction and 
undermine McDonald as support for Ross' action under 
Title III. 
 
Similarly, we find that Ross' reliance upon Pruitt v. United 
Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America, 659 F. 
Supp. 1511 (N.D. Ga. 1987), vacated on other gr'ds, 893 
F.2d 1216 (11th Cir. 1990), is misplaced because Pruitt too 
is distinguishable from the instant case. There, the court 
was not asked to find a private cause of action for damages 
under S304 of Title III. Rather, Pruitt sued under both Title 
I and Title III alleging that an appointed trustee had 
prevented him from assuming an elected position in 
retaliation for the exercise of free speech. Id.  at 1514. The 
court discussed the statutory presumption of validity that 
attaches to trusteeships under S 304 of Title III in inquiring 
into whether the trusteeship in question had been imposed 
for a proper purpose. Id. at 1517, 1520. The issue 
addressed by the court was whether the "plaintiff 's Title III 
claims fail as a matter of law under the clear and 
convincing evidence standard [of S304]." Id. at 1519. The 
court merely ruled that "a triable issue may exist as to 
whether the trusteeship was maintained to block plaintiff 
from assuming his elected position" Id. at 1520. More 
importantly, Pruitt, unlike Ross, stated a Title I claim based 
upon his assertion that the trusteeship had precluded him 
from assuming an elected position. Id. at 1522. 
 
Finally, Ross relies upon the decision of the Court of 
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in Pope v. Office and 
Professional Employees International Union, 74 F.3d 1492 
(6th Cir. 1996). Pope was an appointed business 
representative of Local 268 of the Office and Professional 
Employees International Union (OPEIU). Soon after his 
appointment, he alleged wrongdoing and mismanagement 
on the part of officers of Local 268. Id. at 1496. Support for 
Pope's outspoken criticism of the Local's leadership soon 
flourished, and he became a candidate for president of the 
Local despite opposition of the OPEIU, and local board. Id. 
at 1497. After one very chaotic meeting of the Local, the 
OPEIU granted the local board's request, and imposed a 
trusteeship to control Local 268 pending a hearing to 
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determine its propriety. Id. at 1498. Thereafter, the union 
held a hearing and determined that the trusteeship was 
appropriate despite Pope's protestations to the contrary. 
Shortly thereafter, Pope was fired, and his union 
membership was withdrawn without notice or opportunity 
to be heard. Id. at 1499. Pope was therefore ineligible to 
run for president of the Local. Elections were held, a new 
slate of officers was elected, and the trusteeship was 
thereafter terminated. Id. at 1500. However, before the 
trusteeship was terminated, Pope sued in district court. 
 
Pope argued that the trusteeship violated Title III of the 
LMRDA, and that denying him eligibility to run for union 
office violated Title I of the LMRDA. Id. He sought monetary, 
declaratory and injunctive relief. However, after the 
elections took place the declaratory and injunctive claims 
were dismissed as moot. Id. The suit proceeded to trial, and 
the jury awarded Pope compensatory and punitive damages 
against the OPEIU. Id. 
 
OPEIU appealed claiming that the LMRDA is designed to 
protect rank and file union members and not officers and 
employees and that Pope therefore lacked standing as an 
appointed employee. Id. at 1501. In resolving those issues, 
the Court reconciled the jury's verdict with the holdings in 
Finnegan, Lynn, and Gesink. The court also reconciled the 
jury's verdict with the holding in Cehaich v. International, 
UAW, 710 F.2d 234 (6th Cir. 1983), a case involving similar 
facts decided subsequent to Finnegan. Cehaich and Pope 
had both been appointed employees of local unions, but 
Cehaich's "status as a member of the union did not change 
after he was terminated from his appointed position. He 
was not fined, suspended, expelled or disciplined." Pope, 74 
F.3d at 1502. The court reasoned as follows: 
 
       In Finnegan, the appointed officials of an ousted board 
       were not protected by the LMRDA because union 
       members elected a new board. In Lynn, the elected 
       officials were protected because they had been elected 
       by the union members. The purpose of ensuring 
       democracy is furthered by allowing Pope a cause of 
       action under the LMRDA. Pope was appointed a 
       business representative by an elected local executive 
       board. That board was not ousted as in Finnegan . 
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       Moreover, unlike Cehaich, Pope was expelled from 
       union membership immediately after his termination 
       from his position as business representative. Thus, 
       Pope's case is clearly distinguishable from Cehaich. 
       Pope is entitled to protection under the LMRDA 
       because he was disciplined in a manner which affected 
       his right to fully enjoy the rights and privileges of 
       union membership. 
 
Id. at 1503. 
 
However, most significantly for our purposes, the court 
held that Pope's suit was not moot merely because the 
trusteeship had since been terminated. The court reached 
that result by reading Title I and Title III together and 
concluding that "[t]he question of the propriety of the 
trusteeship is not moot because it has direct bearing on 
whether Pope's Title I rights were violated." Id. The violation 
of Title III supported Pope's claim for damages because "[his 
was] an action at law to recover damages for the 
suppression of Title I rights as a result of the imposition of 
a trusteeship." Id. at 1505. 
 
However, Ross is not alleging a violation of Title I. He was 
not expelled from membership, and he was reinstated to his 
appointed position within 24 hours of being removed from 
it.20 In reviewing the grant of summary judgment for the 
defendants here, we must assume that they denied Ross' 
eligibility to run for election solely to keep him from 
running in the election. Although a union member's right to 
seek elective office is protected under Title I, Id. at 1503; 
Gesink, 831 F. 2d at 217, Ross seeks relief solely under 
S 304 of Title III. Based on the text and legislative history of 
Title III and the Supreme Court's decisions in Finnegan and 
Lynn, we hold that Title III does not allow a private cause 
of action for individual damages flowing from the 
termination of an appointed employee. Relief underS 304 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
20. We do not suggest that a union member must be stripped of his/her 
union membership to state a cause of action under Title I or that prompt 
reappointment will always insulate a defendant from claims of 
retaliation. However, we do note that Ross does not argue that his 
termination as an appointed officer was a scheme to suppress his 
freedom of speech and assembly as a union member under Title I. 
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must be sought on behalf of the local union organization 
and the entire membership must reap the benefits. 
 
Accordingly, we conclude that the district court properly 
determined that there was no genuine issue of material fact 
and that, on the record before it, Ross' Title III claim failed 
as a matter of law. The relief Ross seeks is simply not 
"appropriate" within the meaning of Title III. 
 
IV. Conclusion 
 
For the reasons set forth herein, we conclude that the 
district court did not err in granting summary judgment to 
the defendants under Title III of the LMRDA and that order 
will be affirmed. 
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